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Abstract
We consider the problem of designing residual generators with least dynamical
orders to solve actuator fault detection and isolation problems for the IMMUNE
benchmark problem. The main result of our analysis is the proof of feasibility of
the complete isolation of all primary actuator/surface faults in the nominal case
by using a minimal number of additional surface angle sensors. The analysis of
the nominal case provides residual filter specifications (reference models) to be
employed for robust synthesis of residual generators.
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1 Introduction
The monitoring of primary actuator failures is of paramount importance for the safe operation
of an aircraft, for a continuous situation awareness of pilots, and for the applicability of fault
tolerant control (FTC) techniques to accommodate with various failure modes. The fault detec-
tion and isolation (FDI) of primary actuator failures which are relevant for the application of
FTC techniques is illustrated in this report for the IMMUNE benchmark aircraft model. This
model has a full set of control surfaces/actuators, and the solution of FDI problem represents a
real challenge both because of the high order of the underlying model as well as the structural
limitations imposed by the model.
The main goals of our analysis are: 1) Proving the feasibility of the FDI of all primary
actuator faults; 2) Illustrating the potential of different approaches; 3) Determining achievable
specifications for robust design; 4) Demonstrating the capabilities of recently developed design
tools to solve complex monitoring problems. In what follows we provide some details on these
goals and their achievement.
1) Several fault scenarios are of interest for actuator failures. The ability to detect single
actuator faults is of major importance, being part of the aircraft control system certification
requirements. Accordingly, a minimum requirement for a modern aircraft control system is that
no single failure must lead to a catastrophic consequence. Simultaneous faults can also occur,
especially in conjunction with surface damages. Their detection and isolation requires a more
involved residual generation system and also the availability of a sufficiently large number of
measurements. One of the main results of our study was to demonstrate the feasibility of FDI
for a complete set of faults in a nominal case corresponding to a normal cruise flight.
2) The monitoring and diagnosis of actuator faults can be done at both component as well
as at system level. The component level monitoring is traditionally used on present day aircraft
and relies on the availability of surface angle sensors. Its capabilities to detect and even identify
various fault types (e.g., loss of effectiveness, stuck or runaway faults, floating surface faults)
have been discussed in [14]. However, this scheme has some intrinsic limitations, as for example,
its inability to detect surface failures involving the loss of effectiveness. Also it does not work
properly in the case of surface sensor failures. Therefore, monitoring all types of faults requires
addressing the FDI problem (at least partially) using a system level approach. However, the
system level approach has its own limitations due to the restricted number of available measure-
ments, and therefore a full FDI is not possible unless additional surface sensors are used. An
important result of our analysis is to show that the best FDI performance in terms of isolation
capabilities and on-line implementation efforts are obtained when combining component level
and system level fault monitoring techniques.
3) The results obtained for the nominal case consist of several residual generators and the
corresponding fault-to-residual dynamics. The latter represent meaningful specifications for a
more realistic design where the robustness aspects against parametric and operational point
uncertainties as well as with respect to disturbances (e.g., wind gusts) are addressed. For this
purpose, both optimal structured residual synthesis techniques [18] as well as optimal model-
matching techniques [12] are envisaged to be employed in a future study.
4) The employed computational tools represent enhancements of tools available in the Fault
Detection Toolbox for Matlab developed by the author [13], while the underlying algorithms
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are refined synthesis methods of least order residual generators [15]. It is worth mentioning,
that due to the relatively large order of the underlying system, the reliable synthesis of low
order residual generators was only possible by employing highly sophisticated computational
techniques, like rational nullspace computations based on Kronecker-like forms or minimum
dynamic covers based order reduction.
2 Fault detection and isolation problem
Consider additive fault models described by input-output representations of the form
y(s) = Gu(s)u(s) + Gd(s)d(s) + Gf (s)f(s), (1)
where y(s), u(s), d(s), and f(s) are Laplace-transformed vectors of the the p-dimensional system
output vector y(t), mu-dimensional control input vector u(t), md-dimensional disturbance vector
d(t), and mf -dimensional fault vector f(t), respectively, and where Gu(s), Gd(s) and Gf (s) are
the transfer-function matrices (TFMs) from the control inputs to outputs, disturbance inputs
to outputs, and fault inputs to outputs, respectively. In a deterministic setting the disturbances
are considered as unknown signals, while in a stochastic setting the disturbances are considered
to be stochastic signals (e.g., white noise).
A linear residual generator (or fault detection filter) processes the measurable system outputs
y(t) and control inputs u(t) and generates the residual signals r(t) which serve for decision making
on the presence or absence of faults. The input-output form of this filter is
r(s) = R(s)
[
y(s)
u(s)
]
(2)
where R(s) is the TFM of the filter. For a physically realizable filter, R(s) must be proper (i.e.,
only with finite poles) and stable (i.e., only with poles having negative real parts). The McMillan
degree (or dynamic order) of R(s) is the dimension of the state vector of a minimal state-space
realization of R(s). The dimension q of the residual vector r(t) depends on the fault detection
problem to be solved. For example, for the detection of faults a single residual could be sufficient,
but for isolating a fault among several possible faults a set of residuals grouped into a vector is
needed.
The residual signal r(t) in (2) generally depends via the system outputs y(t) of all system
inputs u(t), d(t) and f(t). The residual generation system, obtained by replacing in (2) y(s) by
its expression from (1), is given by
r(s) = Rf (s)f(s) + Rd(s)d(s) + Ru(s)u(s) (3)
where
[Rf (s)|Rd(s)|Ru(s) ] := R(s)
[
Gf (s) Gd(s) Gu(s)
0 0 Imu
]
For a successfully designed filter R(s), the corresponding residual generation system is proper
and stable and achieves specific fault detection requirements.
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For a given detector with a q × (p + mu) TFM R(s), denote by R
i
fj
(s) the (i, j)-th entry of
the corresponding Rf (s). We can define a q×mf structure matrix S corresponding to a residual
set as follows:
Sij = 1 if R
i
fj
(0) 6= 0
Sij = −1 if R
i
fj
(0) = 0 and Rifj (s) 6= 0
Sij = 0 if R
i
fj
(s) = 0
If Sij = 1 then we say that the fault j is strongly detected in residual i. If Sij = −1 then the
fault j is only weekly detected in residual i. The fault j is not detected in residual i if Sij = 0.
We refer to the i-th row of S as the i-th specification, while the j-th column of S as the signature
(or code) of fault fj. This and related nomenclature used later is borrowed from [2].
The following fault detection and isolation problem (FDIP) can be now formulated: Given
a q × mf structure matrix S determine a bank of q stable and proper scalar output residual
generator filters
ri(s) = R
i(s)
[
y(s)
u(s)
]
, i = 1, . . . , q (4)
such that, for all u(t) and d(t) we have:
(i) ri(t) = 0 when fj(t) = 0, ∀ j with Sij 6= 0;
(ii) ri(t) 6= 0 when fj(t) 6= 0, ∀ j with Sij 6= 0.
In this formulation of the FDIP, each scalar output detector Ri(s) achieves the i-th specifica-
tion of the structure matrix S. The simplest case is to solve the fault detection problem (FDP),
for S = [ 1 1 · · · 1 ], using a scalar output detector. On the opposite side, to achieve the complete
isolation of maximum k simultaneous faults the choice S = Ik is necessary. In many practical
applications this strong isolation requirement can not be achieved due to the lack of sufficient
number of measurements. If we can enforce a structure matrix with distinct fault signatures,
then a so-called week isolation of faults is possible. For example, if for 3 fault inputs the structure
matrix
S =

 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0


can be achieved, then the occurrence of a single fault fj can be detected if all residuals (excepting
the j-th residual) are non-zero. More insight on how to specify fault signatures can be found in
[2, 3].
Let Gfj (s) denote the j-th column of Gf (s) and let S be a given q×mf structure matrix. We
denote by G
i
f (s) the matrix formed from the columns of Gf (s) whose column indices j correspond
to zero elements in the i-th specification. The solvability conditions of the FDIP are given by
the following theorem [2, p. 318]:
Theorem 1 For the system (1) the FDIP with the given fault influence matrix S is solvable if
and only if for each i = 1, . . . , q, we have
rank [Gd(s) G
i
f (s) Gfj (s) ] > rank [Gd(s) G
i
f (s) ] (5)
for all j such that Sij 6= 0.
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The standard approach to determine R(s) is to design for each specification i, a detector
Ri(s) which generates the i-th residual signal ri(t), and thus represents the i-th row of R(s). For
this purpose, the nullspace method to design least order scalar output fault detection filters of
[15, 14] can be applied. For each specification i, we redefine (temporarily) the fault components
fj corresponding to Sij = 0 as disturbances and solve the FDP for the rest of faults whose indices
j correspond to Sij 6= 0. In this way, we obtain a scalar output detector R
i(s) which represents
the i-th row of R(s). The resulting global detector can be assembled as
R(s) =


R1(s)
...
Rq(s)

 (6)
We can also solve the FDIP in a stochastic setting, by considering the disturbances as white
noise, with unit covariance. In this case, for each row Rj(s) of the detector R(s), we impose
additionally the condition that in the absence of faults, the corresponding residual signal rj(t) is
a white noise with unit covariance. If we denote Rjd(s) the j-th row of Rd(s), then this condition
amounts to ask that Rjd(s) is a co-inner function (i.e., R
j
d(s)(R
j
d(−s))
T = 1). Using the approach
proposed in [6], we can update each row of R(s), by replacing Rj(s) by (Gjo(s))−1Rj(s), where
Gjo(s)G
j
i (s) = R
j
d(s) is an outer-coinner factorization of R
j
d(s). The inverse (G
j
o(s))−1 of the
stable and minimum-phase outer factor Gjo(s) is called a whitening filter.
The computational methods for the synthesis of residual generators rely on state space al-
gorithms proposed in [14], where the main computational ingredients are the computation of
proper rational nullspace bases [9, 17], order reduction by employing minimal dynamic covers
based techniques [10], and stable rational factorizations [7]. For all these computations robust
numerical software is available in the Descriptor Systems Toolbox [8]. This software served
as basis to implement a first version of a Fault Detection Toolbox [13], where several tools
are available to solve the main classes of fault detection problems. The most recent version of
this toolbox is fully documented in [16]. A recent addition is a new function to compute the
achievable structure matrix for a given system based on a recently developed efficient and reliable
numerical algorithm [19].
3 Generation of linearized nominal aircraft model
The IMMUNE benchmark nonlinear open-loop aircraft model is representative for a commercial
aircraft with the data given in Table 1. The aircraft control input vector u has dimension 22
including the deflections (in [deg]) of 2 outer ailerons (left/right wing), 2 inner ailerons (left/right
wing), 12 spoilers (6 on the left wing/ 6 on the right wing), 2 elevators (left/right), one trimmable
horizontal stabilizer, one rudder and two engine throttles (left/right). The aircraft model includes
the flight mechanics, aerodynamics, propulsion, environment blocks.
3.1 Trimming and linearization
For the linearization of the nonlinear model the standard Matlab function linmod is used in
conjunction with a highly versatile trimming function trimex.m, which has a similar function-
6
Table 1: Aircraft data
Wingspan 60m
Overall length 65m
Height 20m
Airspeed range 150-550 kts
Maximum operating Mach number 0.86
Operating weight empty 120000kg
Maximum takeoff weight 220000kg
Engines 2
ality as the standard Matlab tool trim.m available in Simulink. There are however two main
differences between trim and trimex. While trim relies on an optimization based trimming,
trimex relies on efficient nonlinear system solvers available via the mex -function interfaces to
nonlinear system solvers and least-squares routines from the subroutine libraries MINPACK [5]
and PORT [1]. A very useful feature implemented in trimex is the optional trimming with sim-
ple bounds on the trim variables. The superiority of the new trimming tool trimex over trim in
what concerns speed (factor of 10 faster) and reliability (accuracy and feasibility) of the results
has been demonstrated in many trimmability studies.
The second main difference concerns handling of underdetermined systems, a typical case
which arises in flight control applications with redundant control surfaces. Such systems are
handled directly by trim via its optimization based setting. This approach does not generally
guarantee physically meaningful trim results (e.g., symmetric controls when trimming a sym-
metric aircraft). In the case of trimex, a flexible mechanism has been devised to eliminate the
indeterminacy, by allowing to work, instead the full control vector u, with a smaller size control
input u˜ such that u = Γu˜, where Γ is a so-called control distribution matrix. This matrix can be
used to allocate a few control actions to many control surfaces, but also can be used to deactivate
a set of control surfaces during trim or for scaling purposes.
3.2 Aircraft state space model with additive faults
Using the above mentioned trimming and linearization tools, we determined a nominal lin-
earized aircraft model in a straight and level flight. The selected trimming point was: speed =
390.9432kts, (or Mach number 0.6494) and altitude of 25.000ft. The chosen values for mass and
x-axis center of gravity were 180000 kg and 0.3, respectively.
From the obtained linearized model, we built a state space model with additive faults of the
form
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Buu(t) + Bdd(t) + Bff(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) + Duu(t) + Ddd(t) + Dff(t)
(7)
where x(t) is the n-dimensional system state vector. The significance of the components of the
variables y(t), x(t), u(t), d(t) and f(t) is described in Appendix A, where also the values of the
matrices of the state-space model are given. The dimensions of vectors x(t), y(t), u(t), d(t) and
f(t), are respectively, n = 10, p = 10, mu = 22, md = 3, and mf = 8. The corresponding TFMs
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of the model in (1) are
Gu(s) = C(sI −A)
−1Bu + Du
Gd(s) = C(sI −A)
−1Bd + Dd
Gf (s) = C(sI −A)
−1Bf + Df
A particular feature of the employed nominal model is that it is unstable. The eigenvalues Λ(A)
of state matrix A are
Λ(A) =


−0.6646 +1.1951i
−0.6646 −1.1951i
−0.0016 +0.0600i
−0.0016 −0.0600i
−1.6550
0.0186 +0.8768i
0.0186 −0.8768i
0.0094
0
0


Morover, one eigenvalue in the origin is not controllable for the system pair (A, [Bu Bd ]).
The actuator and engine models are first order systems with the following transfer functions:
10/(s + 10) for each of two elevators, 0.5/(s + 0.5) for the stabilizer, 6.6/(s + 6.6) for each of
four ailerons and ruder, 5/(s + 5) for each of 12 spoilers and 0.66/(s + 0.66) for each of two
engines. The actuators system corresponds to a 22 × 22 block-diagonal TFM which has a state
space realization of the form
x˙a(t) = Aaxa(t) + Bauc(t)
u(t) = Caxa(t) + Dauc(t)
where xa(t) is the state vector of dimension 22 and uc(t) contains the 20 deflection demands and
the 2 thrust demands. The complete aircraft model resulted by coupling the actuators model at
the system input is[
x˙(t)
x˙a(t)
]
=
[
A BuCa
0 Aa
] [
x(t)
xa(t)
]
+
[
BuDa
Ba
]
uc(t)
+
[
Bd
0
]
d(t) +
[
Bf
0
]
f(t)
[
y(t)
Πu(t)
]
=
[
C DuCa
0 ΠCa
] [
x(t)
xa(t)
]
+
[
DuDa
ΠDa
]
uc(t)
+
[
Dd
0
]
d(t) +
[
Df
0
]
f(t)
(8)
where Π is an input selection matrix. This model has a state vector of dimension 32, 22 control
inputs, and the number of measured variables can range between 10 and 18. The latter case is
when all control surfaces corresponding to monitored actuators are provided with angle sensors.
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By suitably choosing Π, this model allows to study the case of an aircraft without angle sensors
(Π is an 0× 22 empty matrix), or with an arbitrary set of angle sensors (Π is formed from up to
8 rows of the identity matrix I22).
The resulting model (8) with actuator models included is not minimal. Besides the uncon-
trollable eigenvalue in the origin, there are 10 unobservable eigenvalues, all equal to -5. This lack
of observability originates from the fact that the actuators of spoilers are coupled to the aircraft
surfaces via a summation of their effects, thus of the 12 eigenvalues (poles) introduced by the
spoiler actuators, 10 are not observable.
4 Solution of FDIP - deterministic case
For the design of a fault monitoring system, we considered two cases. In the first case we
assumed that no surface angle sensors are employed and we determined the best achievable
signature structure which ensures a week isolation of single faults. In the second case, we add a
minimal number of sensors which allows a better isolation of simultaneous faults.
To compute the achievable structure matrix S for the aircraft model, we need to assess
the weak/strong detectability of combinations of faults. For this purpose, for suitably chosen
detectors Ri(s), we set Sij = −1 if |R
i
fj
(0)| ≤ 0.01 and Rifj (s) 6= 0. In the case, when no surface
angle are used, the achievable structure matrix is a 55 × 8 matrix of the form
S =


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 −1 0 −1 1 1 1 1
0 −1 0 −1 1 1 1 0
0 −1 −1 0 1 1 1 1
...
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0


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where, as it can be observed, there are many lines containing negative entries corresponding to
week detectability of the faults. There are 47 strongly detectable specifications which can be
used as basis for selecting an optimal desired set of specifications for the sensor free case.
For example, the signature structure
S1 =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
]
can be used to perform fault detection at system level (e.g., to complement an already existing
component level monitoring). The resulting detector has order 5 and the step responses from the
faults can be seen in Fig. 1. Thus, strong fault detection can be achieved without any additional
surface angle sensor information.
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Figure 1: Step responses from the faults
It is possible to achieve the isolation of all single faults using the following specification
S2 =


0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


which ensures the strong isolation of ruder faults (independently of other faults) and the weak
isolation of the rest of faults occurring one at a time. The resulting bank of 6 detectors has
a global order 32, where the six scalar output detectors have the orders: {6, 6, 6, 6, 4, 4}. In
Fig. 2 we present the step response of the fault detection system, from which the achieved fault
signature can be easily read out.
By employing angle sensors on the two outer ailerons and on the stabilizer, a better isolation
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Figure 2: Step responses from the faults
of simultaneous faults can be achieved using the specification
S3 =


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1


This provides strong fault isolation for the outer ailerons, stabilizer and ruder (the faults can
be isolated if they occur simultaneously or not with other faults) and weak fault isolation for
left/right inner ailerons and left/right elevators. The resulting bank of 8 detectors has a global
order 27, where the six scalar output detectors have the orders: {1, 5, 5, 1, 5, 5, 1, 4}. Note that
the first order detectors correspond to a component level monitoring and the resulting detectors
are the same as when considering actuator/surface systems alone with first order dynamics. In
Fig. 3 we present the step response of the fault detection system, from which the achieved fault
signature can be easily read out.
Strong isolation of all faults, i.e. the specification S4 = I8, can be achieved with 7 angle
sensors and a detector of global order 9, or with 8 sensors and a detector of global order 8. This
last case corresponds to employing only local monitoring and due to the employed least order
synthesis based approach [14], can be completely recovered using an unique high order system
model.
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Figure 3: Step responses from the faults
5 Solution of FDIP - stochastic case
It is interesting to compare two cases for the synthesis of residual generators for fault detection:
first, when we completely ignore the noise inputs in the synthesis of the residual generator, and
second, when we use additionally a whitening filter. In both cases, the resulting filter has order
4. For the first case, we show in Fig. 4 the time response of the residual signal to a right outer
aileron fault represented by an unit step at t = 6.6 sec and white noise disturbance inputs of
covariance 0.1.
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Figure 4: Residual r1 response to a unit step in f1
Contrasting with this, in the second case a strong filtering effect can be observed in Fig. 5,
where the same inputs are used. This solution is practically the same as that obtained by using
the recently proposed H−/H2 and H−/H∞ techniques [18].
We can now apply the whitening filters to each residual generator output corresponding to
the signature structure S2. The resulting total order of the detector is 25 and the orders of
12
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individual detectors are {5, 5, 5, 5, 3, 2}. Note that this order is less than the global order, 32, of
the corresponding residual generator obtained in the deterministic setting. The time responses
for three single faults in f1, f3, and f8 are shown in Fig. 6. Observe that the achieved fault
signatures (columns 1, 3, and 8 of S2) can be easily read out form the corresponding time
responses.
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Time (sec)Figure 6: Residual time responses to unit steps in single faults
The global detector corresponding to S3 has order 17, with the individual detectors having
orders: {1, 3, 3, 1, 3, 3, 1, 2}. As before, the first order detectors correspond to a component level
monitoring.
The main difficulty of using the stochastic setting is that the dynamics of the detector is
determined by the zeros of the outer factors, and thus is fixed. This led to a poor dynamics of
the fault detection system in always all cases. Thus, although the achieved orders are generally
smaller than for the equivalent deterministic problems, still the detectors are more difficult to
be used in safety critical applications like an aircraft.
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6 Conclusions
The combination of component and system level fault monitoring allows the practical solution of
the FDIP for 8 primary actuator faults in both deterministic and stochastic settings. We have
shown that 3 surface angle sensors are sufficient for this purpose. All residual generators have
least orders being obtained using recently developed algorithms based on minimal dynamic cover
techniques [15]. All computations have been done using recently developed numerical software
tools included in the current version V0.8 Fault Detection Toolbox of DLR. This tools are
described and fully documented in [16]. The computed detectors for the nominal case will serve
as specifications for a more realistic design of robust residual generators using optimal synthesis
techniques of residual generators [11, 18].
Two aspects are worth of mentioning to illustrate the new features of the performed synthesis.
The first aspect is the use of least order synthesis techniques, which allows to obtain detectors
of acceptable complexity. Note that without this feature, the generic order of each individual
detector is the system order (see [4] for examples) and thus not acceptable for larger order
systems. For example, for the 6 detectors used to achieve the signature S2 in both deterministic
and stochastic settings, the expected order is 6 × 32 = 192, which is certainly not appropriate
for on-line implementations.
The second aspect is determined by the high reliability of the underlying computational algo-
rithms and of the corresponding software. This feature allows to manipulate a unique relatively
large order system representation to achieve a seamless transition between component and sys-
tem level monitoring. In the extreme case when all angle sensors are provided, the computed
results are the same as individually designed detectors for each actuator.
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A System variables and state-space model matrices
The system variables in the state space model (7) are defined as follows:
y =


roll angle
pitch angle
yaw angle
angle of attack
angle of sideslip
flight path angle
roll rate
pitch rate
yaw rate
true airspeed


, x =


first component of quaternion
second component of quaternion
third component of quaternion
fourth component of quaternion
roll rate
pitch rate
yaw rate
ground speed X axis
ground speed Y axis
ground speed Z axis


u =


right outer aileron deflection
right inner aileron deflection
spoiler1 deflection
...
spoiler12 deflection
left inner aileron deflection
left outer aileron deflection
right elevator deflection
stabilizer trim angle
left elevator deflection
rudder deflection
left engine thrust
right engine thrust


d =

 wind speed X axiswind speed Y axis
wind speed Z axis


f =


right outer aileron fault
right inner aileron fault
left inner aileron fault
left outer aileron fault
right elevator fault
left elevator fault
stabilizer fault
ruder fault


The matrices of the state space model (7) are:
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A =


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0113 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.0113
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0113 0 0.5
−0.4447 0 −19.62 0 −0.003 0 0.061 0 −9.0618 0
0 19.62 0 0.4447 0 −0.062 0 8.5315 0 −199.3932
19.62 0 −0.4447 0 −0.0777 0 −0.8004 0 197.8868 0
0 0 0 0 0 −0.0239 0 −1.5599 0 0.3470
0 0 0 0 0.0001 0 −0.0073 0 −0.5290 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.0019 0 −0.0934 0 0.0136


Bu =


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−0.0009 −0.0009 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006 · · ·
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0552 0.0552 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071
−0.0219 −0.0183 0.0143 0.0127 0.0114 0.0095 0.0079 0.0053 −0.0053
−0.0059 −0.0051 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
−0.0007 −0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 −0.0003
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
−0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0012 −0.0012 −0.0009 −0.0009 0.0021 0.0094 · · ·
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.0071 0.0071 0.0071 0.0142 0.0142 0.0552 0.0552 −0.1360 −0.6063
−0.0079 −0.0095 −0.0114 −0.0254 −0.0286 0.0183 0.0219 −0.0077 0
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 −0.0051 −0.0059 −0.0280 −0.1250
−0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0006 −0.0013 −0.0015 0.0005 0.0007 −0.0002 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0.0021 0 0.1712 0.1712
0 0.0769 0 0
−0.1360 0 0 0
0.0077 0.0051 0.0007 −0.0007
−0.0280 0 0.0015 0.0015
0.0002 −0.0079 0.0079 −0.0079


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Bd =


0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0.0001 0 −0.0314
0 0.0319 0
0.0586 0 0.4097
0 0.0123 0
0.0001 0 0.0038
0 −0.0010 0


, Bf =
[
Bu1 Bu2 Bu15 Bu16 Bu17 Bu19 Bu18 Bu20
]
C =


0 2.5971 0 114.5916 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5998 0 114.7095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 114.5916 0 2.5971 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −0.0129 0 0.2847 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.2850 0 0 0 0
−2.5971 0.0000 114.5916 0 0.0129 0 −0.2849 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.2958 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.2958 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57.2958
0 0 0 0 1.4210 0 0.0644 0 0 0


Du = 0, Dd =


0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 −0.1467
0 −0.1467 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
−0.7321 0 0


, Df = 0
18
